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Abstract 
Social media interactions are popularly implicated in psychological changes like 
radicalization. However, there are currently no viable methods to assess whether social media 
interactions actually lead to such changes. The purpose of the current research was to develop 
a methodological paradigm that can assess such longitudinal change in individuals’ social 
media posts. Using this method, we analyzed the longitudinal timelines of 110 Twitter users 
(40,053 tweets) who had expressed support for Daesh (also known as Islamic State, or ISIS) 
and we compared them to a baseline sample of twitter timelines (215,008 tweets by 109 
users) to investigate the factors associated with within-person increases in conformity to the 
vernacular and linguistic style of tweets that supported violent extremism. We found that 
conformity to both extremist group vernacular and linguistic style increased over time, and 
with mobilizing online interactions. Thus, we show how to detect within-person changes over 
time in social media data and suggest why these changes occur, and in doing so, validate a 
methodological paradigm that can detect and predict within-person change in psychological 
group memberships through social media interactions. 
 
 
Keywords: Social media, social interaction, social identity, linguistic style, radicalization, 
extremism 
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Detecting Psychological Change through Mobilizing Interactions and Changes in 
Extremist Linguistic Style  
 
1. Introduction 
“Social interaction provides the site in which shared ideas about grievance and social 
change can become the foundations for collective action. That is to say, the airing and 
sharing of common perceptions of a grievance are group-making and can create a 
shared basis for taking action to rectify that injustice.” (Smith, Blackwood, & 
Thomas, 2020, p. 21) 
Social interaction can have profound effects on attitudes and behavior (Lewin, 1953). 
For example, just five minutes of face-to-face ingroup interaction about outgroups can 
increase peoples’ intergroup prejudice, discrimination, and their confidence to undertake 
discriminatory intergroup actions (Moscovici & Zavalloni, 1969; Smith & Postmes, 2009, 
2011). This is not just attitude polarization: through social interaction about shared 
grievances, people can develop shared social identification (psychological attachment to and 
cognitive self-definition as a member of a group; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) with a group that 
seeks social change (see McGarty, Thomas, Lala, Smith, & Bliuc, 2014; Smith, Gavin, & 
Sharp, 2015; Smith, Thomas, & McGarty, 2015). For social interaction to have this effect, the 
interactions need to mobilize people around shared grievances and the need for collective 
action to bring about social change (Smith et al., 2020; Smith et al., 2015; Thomas, McGarty, 
& Louis, 2014).  
Mobilizing interactions are communications with others that express perceptions of 
the social context, including intergroup relations and outgroup behavior; and emotional 
reactions to these circumstances, which together capture experiences of social or political 
grievances. This is more than simply expressing negative emotions: communicating 
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perceptions of anger, harm, and threat as well as discussing collective actions is mobilizing 
because those communications express the perception that there is an illegitimate or unjust 
intergroup situation that needs to be changed via collective action (see Haidt, 2007; Graham, 
Haidt, & Nosek, 2009). In essence, communicating about these emotions, perceptions, and 
actions together expresses a socially grounded grievance; each element requires each of the 
other aspects to provide context and clarity. In contrast, communicating feelings of anger, or 
of perceptions of threat alone may not be politically or socially relevant. In essence, 
mobilizing interactions are more than the sum of their parts: they involve an interplay 
between the meaning of the communication of different aspects of grievances (emotions, 
cognitions, actions) and these must be understood together (see van Zomeren, Postmes, & 
Spears, 2008, for a meta-analysis of motivations underpinning collective action).  
The act of communicating about these socially grounded grievances can mobilize 
people to take action (Smith et al., 2020; Smith, et al., 2015; Thomas, & McGarty, 2018). By 
receiving social validation on these perceptions from others during discussions, individuals’ 
subjective perceptions can transform into as-if-objective, shared grievances. Thus, people’s 
grievances become collectivized, and this increases their confidence in acting on them 
(Festinger, 1954; Smith & Postmes, 2011). Engaging in mobilizing interactions therefore 
represents a specific psychological pathway to political engagement and potentially, 
extremism (Smith et al., 2020; Thomas, et al., 2014). Indeed, extremism can be understood as 
a form of collective action because group members are seeking social or political changes 
(Alimi, 2006; Sageman, 2017). As Smith et al. (2020) argue, “if violent extremism is a form 
of collective action, a corollary of this is that psychologically engaging with groups (that is, a 
collective) is part of every journey to violent extremism. Such psychological engagement can 
be captured as social identification: psychological attachment to and cognitive self-definition 
as a member of a group (following Tajfel & Turner, 1979; see Doosje et al., 2016)” (p. 1). 
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The purpose of this article was to investigate whether engaging in mobilizing online 
interactions could increase social identification with a group that is premised upon a set of 
grievances and the perceived need for violent extremist action: Daesh1 (also known as 
Islamic State, ISIS, or ISIL). This is timely and pertinent, as in the wake of the global 
increase in terror attacks (Europol, 2017), politicians have directed social media companies to 
take action to prevent people being radicalized on their platforms (Department for Digital, 
Culture, Media, & Sport, 2019; UK Home Affairs Committee, 2017). The underlying 
assumption made by these politicians was that, because social media offer opportunities for 
supporters and sympathizers of extremist groups to gather virtually and connect with 
likeminded others (Scrivens, Davies, & Frank, 2018), social media interactions may cause 
psychological change, such as an increase in social identification with a group that endorses 
violent extremism.  
The availability of data via some social media platforms’ application programming 
interfaces (APIs) makes it possible to test research questions about the impact of online 
interactions on the psychology of individuals over time. However, despite the availability of 
social media data to researchers, there have been to date no viable methods to use social 
media data to examine, at scale, whether the process of interacting using social media leads to 
within-person changes. Whilst machine learning techniques can be used to detect specific 
types of posts (De Smedt, De Pauw, & Ostaeyen, 2018; Kaati, Omer, Prucha, & Schrestha, 
2015; Scrivens, et al., 2018) and online behavior associated with specific offline activities 
(Brynielsson, Horndahl, Johansson, Kaati, Mårtenson, & Svenson, 2013), there has been no 
research that applies machine learning to longitudinal public social media data to detect 
 
1 In using “Daesh”, rather than “Islamic State” or other associated acronyms, we understand the group as a terrorist 
organization rather than a legitimate state (caliphate). In doing so, we adopt the same nomenclature as many Western 
governments (including Britain, France, and Australia). The name ‘Daesh’ is derived from al-Dawlah al-Islamīyah fī al-ʻIrāq 
wa-al-Shām — and is used as a pejorative acronym; sounding similar to the Arabic words Daes (“one who crushes 
something underfoot”) and Dahes (“one who sows discord”). This name is often deemed preferable to “Islamic State” as it 
separates the religion of Islam from the terrorist group. 
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within-individual change in these types of posts. Therefore, in the current research we (a) 
developed a method that could use longitudinal social media data to model within-person 
changes over time, and (b), examined whether engaging in mobilizing social media 
interactions was associated with these changes.  
To do this, first we leveraged research that suggests that social identification with a 
group could be detected through both what people write (the semantic content, including 
vernacular) and how they write it (their linguistic style; see Chung & Pennebaker, 2007; 
Pennebaker, 2011). Linguistic style is the pattern with which people use function words, 
which are a collection of non-semantic grammatical word categories. These categories 
include, for example, pronouns, prepositions, articles, and conjunctions. The way in which 
people use function words reflects their social psychological states and social relationships, 
and can predict their behavior (Campbell & Pennebaker, 2003; Chung & Pennebaker, 2007; 
Pennebaker, Mehl, & Niderhoffer, 2003; Scholand, Tauscznik, & Pennebaker, 2010; 
Tausczik & Pennebaker, 2009). 
Discussion forum users who have a high degree of social identification with that 
community will also adopt a high level of forum-specific vernacular (Shrestha, Kaati, & 
Cohen, 2017). That is, they will learn and use ingroup jargon. This means that in terms of 
what people write, their ingroup vernacular is a useful marker of their group identity. 
Furthermore, when an individual identifies with a social group and that group identity is 
salient, they will conform to the normative linguistic style of that group (Danescu-Niculescu-
Mizil, West, Jurafsky, Leskovec, & Potts, 2013): a specific pattern of function words. Social 
identification can therefore be expressed both through use of both ingroup vernacular and 
specific group-normative patterns of function words.  
 A consequence of this is that changes in an individual’s use of ingroup vernacular and 
linguistic style towards the profile of a specific group could be an indicator that they are 
Running head: DETECTING CHANGES IN EXTREMIST LINGUISTIC STYLE 
 7 
developing social identification with that group (i.e., they will begin to adopt the vernacular 
and style of that group because it represents group normative behavior, see Turner, 1991). 
This extends work on communication accommodation and linguistic style matching that 
shows that when people engage in conversation (both face-to-face, Giles, Coupland, & 
Coupland, 1991, and via computers, Danescu-Niculescu-Mizil, Gamon, & Dumais, 2011) 
they change their linguistic style to become more similar to that of their partner (Gonzales, 
Hancock, & Pennebaker, 2010). Indeed, linguistic style matching is positively related to 
group cohesiveness (Gonzales et al., 2010). Thus, we assumed that, to the extent that an 
individual Twitter user’s ingroup vernacular and linguistic style became more similar to that 
of prototypical ingroup posts, the more they identified with that group. Whilst someone may 
deliberately change their vernacular to evolve and respond to changing contextual conditions, 
it is more difficult to control use of function words (Pennebaker, 2011; Pennebaker & King, 
1999). Similar to nonconscious mimicry, people produce function words non-consciously. 
Therefore, changes in patterns of function word use is potentially a more robust test of 
psychological change than changes in vernacular. 
 We also drew upon insights from theory that suggests that the mechanism by which 
individuals develop social identification over time with a group that holds a grievance is 
through mobilizing social interactions (Smith et al., 2020; 2015; Smith, McGarty, & Thomas, 
2018). First, to validate this claim, we conducted a pilot study to establish that 
communicating about threat, harm, anger, and collection actions is mobilizing, in that it is 
positively associated with collective action intentions.  
2. PILOT STUDY 
2.1 Method 
2.1.1 Context. The pilot study was conducted with a sample of Hong Kong residents 
during the violent protests of 2019. Massive protests began in June 2019 and lasted several 
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months. They followed the introduction of a controversial bill that would allow extradition of 
people in the Hong Kong Special Administration Region (SAR) to People's Republic of 
China. Despite the Hong Kong government’s suspension and subsequent withdrawal of the 
bill, large-scale demonstrations and protests by Hong Kong residents rapidly transformed into 
regular pro-democracy demonstrations across districts in Hong Kong. Generally peaceful 
protests escalated to violent clashes among citizens, and between citizens and police, on the 
streets and in shopping malls, siege and occupation of governmental buildings and 
universities, and break-in and vandalism of pro-China shops and banks. Due to its massive 
scale, the unrest has been described as a potential public health crisis (Hou & Hall, 2019). 
2.1.2 Design. This study had a simple, one factor design in which participants were 
randomly allocated to one of two communication conditions: mobilizing versus control. In 
both conditions, we asked participants to write 50-100 words, but the topic we asked them to 
write about varied across the conditions. In the control condition, we asked participants to, 
“describe your opinion of the current situation in Hong Kong”. In the mobilizing 
communication condition, we asked participants to, “describe the anger you feel about the 
current situation in Hong Kong. In particular, please describe your perceptions of the harm 
and threat experienced by Hong Kong citizens”. This was designed to elicit mobilizing 
content. We hypothesized that participants would write more content pertaining to harm, 
threat, anger, and collective action in the mobilizing (versus control) condition (H1), and that 
mobilizing content would be positively associated with collective action intentions (H2). 
2.1.3 Participants. To establish the required sample size for a simple mediation 
model in which the communication condition predicted collective action intentions via 
mobilizing interactions, we conducted a power analysis using the continuously varying 
sample size approach to Monte Carlo power analysis with 5000 replications (Schoemann, 
Boulton, & Short, 2017). This suggested that approximately 151 individuals were required to 
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ensure statistical power was at least 80% for detecting the hypothesized indirect effect. We 
recruited 155 participants to allow for any participants that need to be excluded (e.g., for 
incomplete measures). Participants’ mean age was 24.74 years (SD = 6.18). Thirty-three 
percent of the participants identified as male, 65% identified as female, and 2% indicated that 
they would “prefer not to say”. In the five months prior to completing the survey, 72% of 
participants had attended a protest in Hong Kong. Sixty percent identified as a Hong Konger, 
30% as Chinese, and 10% chose not to declare their national identity. Please note that “Hong 
Konger” is an internationally recognized identity but not nationality, therefore with this item 
we captured social self-identification as Hong Konger versus Chinese rather than an 
“official” nationality. 
2.1.4 Measure of collective action intentions. To capture collective action 
intentions, we used a 5-item standardized scale (α= .86) adapted from Moskalenko and 
McCauley (2009). Items were, [I intend to] “encourage family and friends to sign a petition 
to stand up for the cause”; “write a letter to my local politician”; “join a peaceful protest”; 
“donate to an organization that fights for justice for Hong Kongers in a lawful way”; “donate 
to an organization that fights for justice for Hong Kongers but that sometimes breaks the 
law”. 
2.1.5 Mobilizing interactions. The variable for mobilizing interactions included 
communication content pertaining to harm, threat, anger, and collective action. To capture 
this content, we applied the standard LIWC2015 dictionary categories for anger and the 
moral foundations dictionary for harm (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009) to participants’ 
written responses to the question about the political situation in Hong Kong. We used 
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validated custom dictionaries to detect content pertaining to threat and collective action2 
(Smith et al., 2018). Participants wrote 61 words on average (SD = 42.56), and the number of 
words they wrote did not differ significantly across conditions (control condition: M = 58.43, 
SD = 38.87; mobilizing condition: M = 63.69, SD = 46.27), F(1, 153) = 0.59, p = .44.  
Table 1. Factor Loadings and Descriptive Statistics for Mobilizing Interactions Variable 






M SD  1. 2. 3. 4. 
1.  Harm 0.89 2.05 2.81  -    
2.  Threat 0.21 0.43 1.17  .19* -   
3.  Anger 0.61 3.67 4.30  .54** .13 -  
4.  Collective 
Action 
0.18 2.16 2.36  .16* -.04 .13 - 
Note. *p<.05, **p<.001. 
Then, we performed an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) with principal axis factoring 
and oblimin rotation on the observed LIWC variables (Table 1) using the Psych and 
GPARotation packages in R. The EFA indicated that a single factor solution was the most 
appropriate for the data (with one factor’s eigenvalue > 1 and all other eigenvalues < 0.50). 
This single factor accounted for 31% of the variance in the harm, threat, anger, and collective 
action variables and had a sum of squared loading of 1.24. The root mean square of the 
 
2 There were 328 words in total in the four dictionaries, of which 14 words overlapped across dictionaries: 
abuse*, attack*, brutal*, cruel*, destroy*, and kill were in anger and harm; endanger* and harm* were in harm 
and threat; fight was in collective action and harm; hostil* and threat* were in anger and threat; protest was in 
anger and collective action; war, wars, and warring were in harm and anger. This overlap did not substantively 
alter the results. 
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residuals (RMSR) was 0.03; Tucker Lewis Index of factoring reliability = 1.04. We then used 
the factor scores as a predictor variable that we called, “mobilizing interactions”. The factor 
scores for this latent construct represent and contextualize the expression of anger, harm, and 
threat as collective grievances. 
2.2 Results and Discussion 
 To test for causal mediation, whereby communication condition predicted collective 
action intentions through increases in mobilizing interactions3 (controlling for prior protest 
attendance and self-reported identity as a Hong Konger vs. Chinese), we ran Hayes’ 
PROCESS 3.4 macro (model 4) with 5000 bootstrap samples (Hayes, 2018). The model 
explained a significant amount of variance in collective action intentions, R2 = .38, p <.001. 
There was a significant positive direct relationship between communication condition and 
mobilizing interactions, whereby participants communicated more mobilizing content in the 
mobilizing condition (M = 0.19, SD = 1.11) versus control condition (M = -0.18, SD = 0.63), 
β = 0.37, p = .02 (95% Bias-Corrected Bootstrapped Confidence Intervals or CIs = 0.07, 
0.68). This suggested that our manipulation was successful and provided support for H1. The 
indirect effect of communication condition on collective action intentions through mobilizing 
interactions was positive and significant (β = .08; 95% CIs = 0.01, 0.16), supporting H2. The 
direct effect of condition on collective action intentions was non-significant in the presence 
of the mediator (β = 13; 95% CIs = -0.20, 0.47; p =.43). These results suggested that 
communicating about harm, threat, anger, and collective action was mobilizing, in that it 
increased support for undertaking collective action. 
  
 
3 To further verify that mobilizing interactions operate as a single construct, we entered the observed variables 
anger, harm, collective action, and threat separately (instead of the mobilizing interactions variable) at Step 2 of 
a regression model predicting collective action intentions (where condition was entered at Step 1). None of these 
individual variables were significantly related to collective action intentions. However, when the factor scores 
for the mobilizing interaction construct were entered into the model instead of the four observed variables, it 
was significantly related to collective action intentions (β = 0.14, p = .05) and significantly contributed to the 
variance explained, R2ch = .02, Fch(1,145) = 4.04, p = .05. 
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3. MAIN STUDY 
3.1 Method 
3.1.1 The Context 
In this main study, we investigated whether engaging in mobilizing online interactions 
over time facilitated individuals’ socialization as supporters of an extremist group: Daesh. 
We hypothesized that individual Twitter users would conform more to the vernacular and 
linguistic style of tweets by supporters of Daesh that endorsed violent extremism the more 
they engaged in mobilizing interactions on Twitter.  
We collected a corpus of tweets by individual user accounts that showed support for 
Daesh. In 2014 – 2015, Daesh had reached its peak penetration on Twitter, with an estimated 
46,000 – 90,000 Daesh supporters on the platform (Stern & Berger, 2015)4. On Twitter, 
Daesh supporters shared links to extremist material that was hosted by other sites and 
engaged in opinion dissemination and discussion. At the time of data collection for the 
current project (2016/7), Twitter was established as a gateway platform identified by Sunni 
extremists as an important platform for their missionary work. For example, the Shumukh al-
Islam forum released a “Twitter Guide”, in which they outlined why their missionaries should 
use Twitter to recruit new supporters (see Ashcroft, Fisher, Kaati, Omer, & Prucha, 2015). 
Thus, members of Daesh used Twitter to recruit new supporters. Therefore, by collecting 
longitudinal Twitter data, we would be able to examine the mechanisms of interaction on 
Twitter by which supporters of Daesh were recruited and radicalized. This made Twitter an 
appropriate platform on which to test our method and hypothesis. 
  
 
4 These figures should be understood in relation to the nature of the feature set (online behaviors) that was used 
to identify those Twitter accounts as supporting Daesh. These feature sets vary across different research 
projects, with some researchers defining Daesh supporters not by the specific kinds of semantic content they 
post, but by who their followers are (see Berger & Morgan, 2015).  
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3.1.2 Data Collection 
3.1.2.1 Feature Validation. To ensure that we identified a temporally valid sample of 
English-speaking5 Twitter users who explicitly expressed support for Daesh, we 
systematically identified and validated the features (online behaviors) that were associated 
with expressing support for Daesh on Twitter at the time of the research, via a systematic 
four-phase process. The first phase was a literature review of articles that identified social 
media features associated with support for Daesh. The search terms “Islamic State” and 
“social media” yielded 26 articles (across SCOPUS, Web of Science, and PsychINFO). The 
second phase was consultation with terrorism and extremism experts from government, and 
the security and defence sectors. The combination of Phase 1 and 2 provided an initial set of 
65 features associated with expressing support for Daesh. In Phase 3, we manually inspected 
examples of these features on the live Twitter stream to confirm whether or not they could be 
used to manually identify Twitter users who claimed to support Daesh. The fourth phase was 
consultation with members of Muslim community to validate that the features identified 
reliably discriminated between the online behavior of Daesh supporters and mainstream 
Twitter users. We excluded the features that as a result of the consultation process were not 
deemed to be discriminatory. This led to a final set of 30 features, 22 of which were manually 
observable by a human rater at the individual Twitter user level in the live Twitter stream 
(specific details of the features are not described here for ethical reasons6). Manually 
observable features included (but were not restricted to): retweeting Daesh propaganda, 
 
5 Our aim in targeting English-speaking Twitter users was to develop an algorithm that was appropriate for this 
population and to provide proof of concept for the method, rather than to create an algorithm that generalized 
across Daesh supporter populations who communicated in other languages.  
6 We have chosen not to publicly disclose the feature set or the Daesh vernacular dictionary due to the potential 
that they could be used incorrectly to falsely identify individuals as supporters of violent extremism. The 
accuracy of the features reported here is likely to change over time. To establish the temporal stability of the 
features and their predictive validity, future research should use longitudinal ground truth data (independent 
verification of the identity of the users) to validate them. The purpose of this research was not to create a time-
independent, validated algorithm or lexicon but to develop a new method to explore changes in linguistic style 
over time. 
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celebrating suicide bombers, displaying the Daesh flag or rejoicing following a Daesh terror 
attack. These features could include profile pictures/avatars or may have been within the 
profile/Twitter account description.  
Using Chorus Tweetcatcher 1.3 software (Brooker, Barnett, & Cribbin, 2016), we 
searched Twitter for tweets that included the tweet-level manually-observable features. These 
tweets were then inspected to determine whether (or not) they displayed Daesh-supporting 
features; if they did, their associated user accounts were directly inspected both via the 
Twitter website and by extracting their publicly available timelines (tweets and associated 
metrics) from Twitter’s API using Chorus software. Features that could be detected via 
Chorus included specific hashtags and topics of discussion (such as martyrdom operations, or 
the death of a senior Daesh figure) that may not have been visible on a user’s feed on the 
Twitter website (which only shows relatively recent posts), but were available once user 
timelines were retrieved via the API. 
Chorus uses the Twitter API to harvest (up to) the most recent 3200 tweets of 
individual users. So, whilst they may have expressed support for Daesh at the time of data 
collection, 3,200 tweets back in time (weeks or possibly months earlier) they may not have 
been as extremist and/or their focus and narrative may have been different. In fact, if the 
assumption is correct that people and narratives can change (e.g., become more extremist) 
through increased online engagement, then their tweets should be less extremist at the start of 
their timeline, and more extremist in more recent tweets. The search yield for any user is 
limited by the number of tweets that are publicly available for that user name (therefore, 
recently opened accounts would normally yield fewer posts). 
User profiles and live timelines were manually inspected to determine whether (or 
not) they also displayed Daesh-supporting features. The coding was binary: user accounts 
were either coded as expressing support for Daesh (and included in the dataset) or not. We 
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determined the coding criterion for Daesh support as a minimum of two features through the 
validation process described in 2.2.1 above. Using co-occurrence of features (rather than 
single features) ensured that all features were understood not in isolation but in the context of 
their co-occurrence with other features. This also helped to alleviate ethical concerns about 
falsely identifying an account as Daesh-supporting (someone might retweet a Daesh-
sympathetic post once but this might not be as meaningful as if they also use the Daesh flag 
as their avatar). Through this procedure, a human rater identified 110 Twitter accounts that 
explicitly expressed support for Daesh. A second coder independently coded the 110 
accounts, and inter-rater reliability was 100%. We do not make any claims or assumptions 
about the users in this sample beyond the fact that each user expressed support for Daesh in 
their tweets and/or profiles. Since concluding data collection, all of the 110 Daesh-supporting 
user accounts have been suspended by Twitter for violating the terms of use of the platform. 
We also retrieved the longitudinal Twitter data of 109 users to provide a baseline 
against which to compare the behavior of the Daesh supporter sample. This provided a non-
extremist baseline of the features that would be common to both mainstream Muslims and 
Daesh supporters, such as English transliterations of Arabic and content pertaining to Islam. 
Therefore, we retrieved the longitudinal data of 109 Twitter users who had used the hashtag 
#Ramadan. Through using this as the baseline sample/class, we endeavored to ensure that 
features associated with mainstream Islam were not conflated with those that indicated 
support for Daesh7. Discriminatory ability of the features was verified via 2 x 2 chi-square 
tests that found significant differences in the co-occurrence of specific features across the two 
samples. 
 
7 The baseline sample was thus a control group only insofar as it provided a baseline for these features. We 
could compare the Daesh-supporter sample to a variety of different groups, and each time our algorithm would 
produce different coefficients. However, the absolute value of the coefficients is not the outcome of interest: it is 
the change in Daesh-supporter tweet classification relative to the baseline over time that is key to indexing 
change via our method. 
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3.1.2.2 Sample. The data collection strategy resulted in a total sample of 255,061 tweets 
in English (40,053 tweets by 110 Daesh supporters, and 215,008 tweets by 109 users in the 
baseline sample; 16 tweets were omitted due to missing data; the data for the analyses 
described below are available in the Mendeley Database, doi:10.17632/jz9hm3n49d.1). An a 
priori power analysis established that the sample size required for a medium effect size (F2 = 
0.15) was 189 observations (to detect significance at p < .05 in a linear regression model with 
13 predictors). The Daesh-supporter tweet sample was smaller because the Daesh-supporting 
accounts were “younger” with fewer tweets than the baseline accounts. This is likely to be a 
result of Twitter’s effort at the time to remove Daesh-related activity. A high proportion of 
Daesh-supporters had multiple, short-lived sequential accounts, because previous 
incarnations of the account were suspended by Twitter. We control for multiple accounts by 
the same user in our analyses. 
3.1.3 Natural Language Processing of Tweet Content 
 3.1.3.1 Function words. Following linguistic style matching research (see Gonzales 
et al., 2010), we used Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC2015) software (Pennebaker, 
Booth, & Francis, 2007) to establish the proportion of words within each tweet that appeared 
in the LIWC function words dictionary categories (lexicons). The LIWC function word 
categories each contain words that cluster together according to their grammatical function 
(e.g., pronouns, articles, prepositions; Biber, 1988; Pennebaker, Boyd, Jordan, & Blackburn, 
2015; Tausczik & Pennebaker, 2009). There was no overlap between the content of these 
lexicons and the features that we used to identify the sample of Daesh-supporters’ Twitter 
accounts. The function word categories are described in Table 2.  
The pattern of function words that a group member uses indicates their knowledge of 
a specific social psychological context. This is because to use and understand certain function 
words, the interlocutors must have a shared “insider” knowledge of spatial and temporal 
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relations, intergroup relations, the salient outgroup(s), and so on. For example, pronouns can 
indicate whether an individual's focus is on their personal identity (first-person singular  
Table 2 
Meaning of LIWC Function Word Categories 






Prepositions are referential and help describe spatial and temporal 
relations (Lucic & Bridges, 2018).   
Third person plural 
pronouns (“they”, 
“their”, “they’d”) 
Third person pronouns are markers to suggest that the speaker is 
aware of a specific outgroup. 
Articles 
(“a”, “an”, “the”) 
Articles are referential. To know the meaning of an, the, etc. 
demands that the speaker and 
listener have a shared understanding of the specificity of the 
context (the use of “a” versus “the”). 
Auxiliary verbs 
(“is”, “do”, “have”) 
Auxiliary verbs are part of a passive (versus active) way of 





Second person pronouns are markers to suggest that the speaker is 
socially engaged or aware. 
First person singular 
pronouns (“I”, “me”, 
“mine”) 
Use of first person singular is associated with age, sex, depression, 
illness, and more broadly, self-focus; self-attention; honesty. 
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First person plural 
pronouns (“we”, 
“us”, “our”) 
First person plural can be a marker of group identity/community 
(Pennebaker & Lay 2002).  
Negations 
(“no”, “not”, “never”) 
Negations provide assertions with specific polarity (truthfulness or 
falseness). Negations are easier to understand, and to formulate, 
when interlocutors have a shared understanding of the possibilities 




Conjunctions are operative terms that connect and qualify two 
sentence components to provide a conditional, truth-functional 
meaning (Bott, Frisson, & Murphy, 2009).  
Impersonal pronouns  
(“it”, “its”, “those”) 
Refer to the object of discussion. To know the meaning of it, its, 
those, etc. demands that the speaker and listener have a shared 








Adverbs modulate the meaning of verbs, adjectives, other adverbs, 
and noun phrases and thus evaluate what is being spoken of 
(Quirk, Greenbaum, Leech, & Svartvik, 1985).  
 
pronouns such as “I”, “me”, “my”), or on their identity as a group member (first-person plural 
pronouns such as “we”, “our”). Use of third person plural pronouns (“they”, “them”) requires 
interlocutors to have shared knowledge of who the relevant outgroups are (Lyons, Aksayli, & 
Brewer, 2018). Prepositions describe spatial and temporal relations (Lucic & Bridges, 2018): 
To know the meaning of over, on, to, etc., requires that the interlocutors understand the 
Running head: DETECTING CHANGES IN EXTREMIST LINGUISTIC STYLE 
 19 
relative, real, or symbolic location of the subject of the communication (Pennebaker, Mehl, & 
Niederhoffer, 2003). Whilst each category of function words has unique psychological 
meaning, it is the pattern of them in relation to each other in a text that represents the ingroup 
norm for linguistic style (see Gonzales, Hancock, & Pennebaker, 2009) and ingroup context 
and its central players. Therefore, we were interested in how much users adhered to a 
particular pattern of function words, or a particular linguistic style, overall, and how this 
changed over time (rather than the raw scores of or correlations between each category of 
function words, per se). 
3.1.3.2 Mobilizing interactions. To capture mobilizing interactions within tweets by 
Daesh supporters8, we used the same method as in the pilot study. First, we performed an 
EFA with principal axis factoring and oblimin rotation on the observed LIWC variables, 
harm, threat, anger, collective action, and Twitter interactions (@mentions; Table 3). The 
EFA indicated that only one factor had an eigenvalue above 1.00 and this factor accounted 
for 29% of the variance in the harm, threat, anger, collective action, and Twitter interactions 
variables, and had a sum of squared loading of 1.45. The root mean square of the residuals 
(RMSR) was 0.03, the Tucker Lewis Index of factoring reliability was 0.93; RMSEA = 0.06. 
We then saved the factor scores for the single factor to use as a predictor variable named 
mobilizing interactions. 
To establish face validity of the mobilizing interactions construct, we manually coded 
a subset of tweets (Table 4) for whether or not they were mobilizing. The factor scores for 
mobilizing content ranged from -0.58 to 16.60, with a median of -0.49. We selected 25 tweets 
 
8 A factor analysis on the baseline sample indicated that the latent variable was not a good fit for those data: the 
factor loading for twitter interactions (@mentions) was 0.01 (compared to 0.07 in the Daesh-supporters sample). 
This implies that users in the baseline sample engaged in very little interaction with other users on Twitter about 
harm, threat, anger, and collective action. This is unsurprising given that (unlike the Daesh-supporter sample) 
the baseline sample of tweets was not authored by a psychological group with a grievance around which to 
interact and mobilize. Therefore, there was no conceptual or statistical justification for computing the 
mobilizing interactions variable for the baseline tweet sample. 
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randomly from each quartile of factor scores, and two coders independently coded each 
tweet, with a third coder resolving any disagreements. We used two coding categories: a) 
mobilizing; b) not mobilizing. The tweets were coded as mobilizing (versus not mobilizing) if 
they included any content pertaining to harm or threat to Muslims, anger, and collective 
action. We computed Cohen’s kappa (Cohen, 1960) for the coder pair to provide an index of 
inter-rater reliability for each quartile. The resulting kappas indicated an acceptable level of 
inter-rater agreement (Table 4; Landis & Koch, 1977).  
Table 3 
Factor Loadings and Descriptive Statistics for Mobilizing Interactions Variable (Daesh 







M SD  1. 2. 3. 4. 5
. 
1.  Harm 0.62 0.21 1.36  -     
2.  Threat 0.12 0.02 0.41  0.01** -    




-   
4.  Collective 
Action 





5.  Twitter 
Interactions 





Note. **p = .01, ***p<.001 
As expected, in the fourth quartile, which containing tweets with the highest factor 
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scores, there was a significantly greater number of tweets coded as mobilizing than not 
mobilizing, χ2 (1) = 4.84, p = .03. In the third and second quartiles, there was no difference 
between the number of tweets coded as mobilizing and not mobilizing, (Q3: χ2 (1) = 2.00 p = 
.35; Q2: χ2 (1) = 2.00, p = .35). In the first quartile, containing the lowest factor scores, there 
was a significantly greater number of tweets coded as not mobilizing than mobilizing, χ2 (1) 
= 14.44, p < .001. This suggested the variable had appropriate face validity. 
Table 4 
Coding of Tweets for Mobilizing Interactions 
  %  
Code Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
1 Mobilizing 12 40 60 72 
0 Non-mobilizing 88 60 40 28 
 k .78 .64 .76 .81 
Note. Q = quartile of factor scores, whereby Q4 contained the highest factor scores (tweets 
containing the highest proportion of mobilizing content) and Q1 contained the lowest factor 
scores. k = Cohen’s Kappa. 
 3.1.3.3 Daesh vernacular. Through the literature review, and consultation process 
with terrorism and extremism experts from government and the security and defence sectors 
(as described in 3.1.2.1 above), we developed a new custom dictionary for Daesh vernacular 
(contents not disclosed for ethical reasons) that included derogatory terms aimed at non-
Daesh supporters, Daesh-relevant terms, and transliterations of Daesh-relevant Arabic words. 
Taken together the combination of and overall prevalence of these words (rather than the use 
of each word individually) was associated with sympathy for Daesh. We validated the Daesh 
vernacular dictionary using an independent sample of 2,359 English language tweets that 
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included the hashtag #Dabiq (the Daesh official magazine), which were collected 
independently of this study in mid-2016. The mean percentage of words in the tweets in this 
dataset that were in the Daesh vernacular dictionary was 10.19 (SD = 6.68), the median was 
10.00, with a range of 50. This suggests that the content of this dictionary generalized across 
relevant samples.   
3.1.4 Analytic Strategy  
Our analysis then proceeded via two steps. The first step was to train a learning 
algorithm on a gold-standard subset of tweets to discriminate between extremist tweets and 
non-extremist tweets. The application of this algorithm to the rest of the data corpus then 
provided each tweet with a probability that it was extremist versus not extremist. We 
assumed that within the sample of 40,053 tweets authored by Daesh users there would be 
variation in the extent to which those tweets would be extremist (defined as showing support 
for violent extremism, whether directly authored (in an original tweet) or not (retweeted)). To 
this end, we sought to exploit within-person variation in tweet-level linguistic style to model 
the factors that were positively associated with within-person increases in extremist linguistic 
style (as a proxy for psychological change). The second step therefore was to assess the 
extent to which users’ tweets became more extremist over time (indexed via the probability 
of classification as extremist in step 1), and to identify the factors associated with such 
changes.  
Therefore, for the first step we manually-coded a gold-standard training set of 2,000 
extremist human-rated tweets from the Daesh sample and 2,000 non-extremist tweets from 
the baseline sample (as per Burnap, Gibson, Sloan, Southern, & Williams, 2016). The 2,000 
extremist tweets for the training sample met the following criterion: The tweets endorsed 
violent extremism and/or Daesh (as a violent extremist group)9. All of these tweets included 
 
9 In setting this criterion, we adopted as a starting point the United States government’s definition of violent 
extremists as “individuals who support or commit ideologically-motivated violence to further political goals,” 
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one or more of the following features: support for violent extremism, including support for 
Jihād (struggle/war on the path of God), Mujāhidīn (Jihadist fighters), and Istishhad (a 
martyrdom operation); support for Daesh, including al-walā’ wa al-barā’ (unconditional 
adherence to the Islamist project and the group supporting it, and disavowal and 
disassociation of other causes and groups supporting them), sharing Daesh propaganda 
(including “shoutouts” and Daesh Telegram channels), praise for the Caliphate (Khilafah) 
and criticism of Kufr (unbelief, disbelief) and Kuffār (unbelievers). Coding allowed for 
variations of spellings of these features. Whilst there was variation in exactly how extremist 
those features were, they were all confirmed as associated with support for violent extremism 
in our earlier four-step validation process, justifying a binary coding framework (extremist 
versus not extremist). Thus, all tweets in the training sample met the criterion. A second 
coder manually verified the coding of the training sample. We also randomly selected 2,000 
tweets from the baseline sample that did not contain any of those extremist features. A coder 
manually verified that these baseline tweets were not extremist. This provided a total training 
sample of 4,000 gold-standard tweets for the classifier. The remaining dataset of 251,061 
tweets formed the test sample.  
All Daesh users both authored tweets directly and retweeted – in other words, it was 
normative Daesh-supporter behavior to both compose original tweets and retweet (see 
Supplemental Materials). For this reason, our training sample included extremist tweets that 
were both directly authored (52.3%, n = 1046) and retweeted (47.7%, n = 954). The ratio of 
directly authored tweets to retweets in the training sample reflected the fact that directly 
authored tweets were on average more extremist than retweets and therefore, there were more 
directly authored tweets that were suitable to include in the training sample. The same 
 
(Executive Office of the President of the United States, 2016). We then included, as per the United Kingdom’s 
use of the term, the activities of individuals who influence the radicalization of others, and encourage others to 
engage in violent extremism (House of Commons, 2009-10; see Middle East Institute, 2015). 
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inclusion criteria were applied to both types of tweets. For details of the differences between 
retweets and directly authored tweets across the two samples, please refer to the 
Supplemental Materials.  
 The classifier used the linguistic style of those extremist Daesh tweets to calculate the 
probability that the 251,061 tweets in the remainder of the sample were written in this 
extremist (versus non-extremist) linguistic style. Once we had trained the learning algorithm 
on extremist tweets, we could proceed to the second step of our analysis.  
The second analytic step was to predict the extent to which each individual user’s 
tweets became more extremist over time and with the extent to which they engaged in 
mobilizing interactions. To do this, we applied the algorithm (Table 5) to the whole dataset 
(minus the training sample of 4,000 tweets; creating the test sample, n = 251,061). We saved 
the probability that each tweet was classified as extremist (due to how much it conformed to 
the linguistic style of the extremist tweets of Daesh supporters), and then used the logit of 
that probability (the logarithm of the odds) as a dependent variable in a subsequent multi-
level linear mixed-effects model (LMM), in which tweets were nested within users. Through 
using this as a dependent variable in an LMM, we could predict whether an individual user 
changed in how much they conformed to the linguistic style of extremist tweets over time 
(e.g., became more similar to the tweets that expressed support for violent extremism, 
showing psychological change), and we could model the factors associated with those 
changes.  
3.2 Results 
3.2.1 Classifying Tweets Using Linguistic Profiles 
 Using the training subset of 4,000 tweets (2,000 human-rated extremist tweets from 
the Daesh sample and 2,000 randomly selected tweets from the baseline sample), we 
conducted a logistic regression to predict the class of tweet author (Daesh-supporter vs. 
Running head: DETECTING CHANGES IN EXTREMIST LINGUISTIC STYLE 
 25 
baseline user) from scores on the Daesh vernacular custom dictionary and function words 
dictionaries. The null deviance (df = 3999) of this training model was 5545.20; residual 
deviance (df = 3986) = 2413.70; AIC = 2441.70; McFadden R2 = 0.56. To test the accuracy of 
the classifier, we conducted a 10-fold cross validation on the training set. Results of the 10-
fold cross validation showed that the algorithm that included both function words and Daesh 
vernacular was 89% accurate on average (κ = 0.78; 95% CIs 0.88, 0.90), F-score = 0.89, 
average precision = 0.90 and recall = 0.88, and the area under the receiver operating 
characteristic curve (AUROC) was 0.94 (Table 5).  
Table 5 
Logistic Regression Results for Training set (n = 4,000).  
Predictor Β SE Odds ratio Z Wald p 
Daesh vernacular 0.41 0.02 1.51 25.45 699.53 <0.001 
Prepositions 0.11 0.01 1.11 12.62 159.29 <0.001 
Third person plural pronouns  0.17 0.03 1.18 6.70 44.88 <0.001 
Articles 0.08 0.01 1.08 6.21 38.53 <0.001 
Auxiliary verbs 0.06 0.01 1.06 5.79 33.55 <0.001 
Second person singular pronouns  -0.08 0.01 0.93 -5.30 28.10 <0.001 
First person singular pronouns  -0.07 0.02 0.93 -4.28 18.33 <0.001 
First person plural pronouns  -0.08 0.03 0.92 -3.07 9.41 0.002 
Negations -0.06 0.02 0.94 -3.04 9.22 0.002 
Conjunctions 0.03 0.01 1.03 2.17 4.72 0.03 
Impersonal pronouns 0.01 0.01 1.01 0.47 0.22 0.64 
Quantifiers 0.01 0.02 1.01 0.36 0.13 0.72 
Adverbs -0.002 0.01 1.00 -0.20 0.04 0.84 
Note. The reference group for interpreting the odds ratios is the Daesh supporter sample, i.e., 
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for every one unit increase in use of Daesh vernacular, the odds of a tweet being classified as 
emanating from a Daesh supporter account increased by a factor of 1.51. Variables are listed 
in order of importance to the model (most: least).  
Due to the volatility of vernacular over time relative to the stability of function words, 
we also tested whether the classifier could accurately predict the user account of tweets 
(Daesh vs. baseline) using an algorithm that only used the function words. The residual 
deviance (df = 3987) of this model was 3914.40; AIC = 3940.40; McFadden R2 = 0.29. A 10-
fold cross validation showed that the classifier was 79% accurate on average (κ = 0.58; 95% 
CIs 0.78, 0.80); F-score = 0.78, average precision = 0.79 and recall = 0.78, AUROC = 0.85. 
A likelihood ratio test comparing the models showed that the algorithm that included Daesh 
vernacular fit the data better; χ2(1) = 1500.80, p<.001. However, taken together these 
statistics suggest that there is utility in using linguistic style to detect within-person changes 
online. Indeed, from an operational and ethical perspective, not having to be reliant on 
vernacular could be a useful feature. 
However, because we were interested in predicting the extent to which each 
individual user’s tweets became more extremist in terms of both how (function words) and 
what (Daesh vernacular) they wrote, we applied the algorithm that included function words 
and Daesh vernacular (Table 5) to the whole dataset (minus the training sample of 4,000 
tweets; creating the test sample; 251,061 of tweets). We saved the probability that each tweet 
was classified as emanating from an Daesh-supporter account (due to how much it conformed 
to the linguistic style of the extremist tweets of Daesh supporters), and then used the logit of 
that probability (the logarithm of the odds) as a dependent variable in the subsequent LMMs. 
3.2.2 Linear Mixed Model Predicting Within-Person Changes in Linguistic Style 
To establish whether the users in the Daesh-supporter sample showed change over time 
relative to baseline, we conducted an LMM with grand mean centering and random slopes in 
Running head: DETECTING CHANGES IN EXTREMIST LINGUISTIC STYLE 
 27 
which the observations (251,061 tweets; Level 1) were nested within people (209 Twitter 
users; Level 2). The LMM assessed how the logit of the probability of individual users being 
classified as a Daesh supporter due to conformity to the linguistic style of extremist tweets 
changed over time (absolute time, indexed as account age in days and standardized across 
samples, and with chronological tweet number and the total volume of tweets sent by the 
user, both representing relative time), controlling for the users’ number of sequential accounts 
(as a proxy for number of times the user had accounts suspended for violating Twitter’s 
community standards). The inclusion of these variables enabled us to assess the impact of 
time in the presence of account suspensions. We also included a variable to distinguish 
between directly authored tweets and retweets, and the users’ number of followers and the 
number of accounts that they followed, as proxies for their social network size. Results are 
available in Table 6. In LMM, absolute values of the t statistic greater than or equal to 1.96 
indicate an effect that was significant at p< .05.  
There was a main effect for sample, whereby Daesh-supporters were significantly 
more extremist than baseline. We found a significant interaction between sample (Daesh-
supporter versus baseline) and account age (Figure 1), showing that conformity to the 
extremist linguistic style increased over time for Daesh-supporters (γ = 0.02, p<.05) but 
decreased for baseline users (γ = -0.17, p<.05). We also found a significant two-way 
interaction between sample and tweet type (directly authored versus retweet), whereby 
Daesh-supporters’ directly authored tweets conformed significantly more to the extremist 
linguistic style than their retweets, γ = 0.47, p<.05, but baseline users’ directly authored 
tweets conformed significantly less to the extremist linguistic style than their retweets, γ = -
0.79, p<.05.  
We then repeated this analysis using the algorithm that relied only on function words 
and not Daesh vernacular (that is, the LMM predicted changes in non-conscious linguistic 
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style only) and found the same results interaction between sample and tweet type, γ = 0.22, p 
<.05; but no interaction between sample and account age, γ = -0.001, p>.05.  
Table 6  
LMM Results Predicting Logit of the Probability of Daesh Class Membership (Based on 
Conformity with Extremist Linguistic Style) of Daesh Supporters and Baseline Users 
(Users, N = 209, Tweets, n = 251,061). 
Predictor γ SE t F 
Sample: Daesh-supporting 
(v. baseline) 
2.05* 0.16 13.13 377.66 
Tweet type: Directly 
authored (vs. retweeted) 
0.47* 0.01 50.86 3964.69 
Account age (days, 
standardized) 
0.02* 0.01 2.39 15.12 
Total tweet volume 
(standardized) 
-0.26* 0.07 -3.78 15.31 
Chronological tweet 
number (log. transformed) 
-0.003 0.01 -0.52 0.20 
Number of sequential 
accounts 
0.25 0.17 1.47 2.49 
Number of followers 
(standardized) 
-0.01 0.10 -0.10 0.02 
Number of accounts the 
user followed 
(standardized) 
-0.03 0.04 -0.80 0.27 
Sample x Tweet type  0.31* 0.02 14.17 200.78 
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Sample x Account age 0.15* 0.03 5.47 34.45 
Note. *p<.05.  
Figure 1 
LMM Predicting Changes in the Probability of Individual Users being Classified as a 
Daesh Supporter over time.  
 
Note. The line for the Daesh sample is shorter than the line for baseline accounts because 
Daesh-supporting accounts were younger than baseline accounts on average, and age of 
account was standardized across (rather than within) samples. This was necessary for 
comparability across samples over time in the LMM. 
To investigate the mechanisms underlying the increases in conformity to the extremist 
linguistic style for Daesh-supporter accounts, we repeated the LMM using the Daesh-
supporter data only (Table 7). Time (account age, in days, standardized within Daesh-
supporting sample; controlling for relative time) was positively related to conformity with the 
extremist linguistic style, providing evidence for change over time (Figure 1). Mobilizing 
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interactions were also positively related to conformity to the extremist linguistic style10, 
suggesting that interactions of this nature may provide a mechanism to explain these changes 
(Figure 2). Directly authored tweets were more extremist than retweets (see Supplemental 
Materials).  
Table 7 
LMM Results Predicting Logit of the Probability of Daesh Class Membership of Daesh 
Supporters (Users, N = 110, Tweets, n = 38,053). 
Predictor γ SE t F 
Tweet type: Directly authored 
(vs. retweet) 
0.69*/0.35* 0.03/0.02 22.83/20.20 692.54/481.84 
Account age (days, standardized) 0.14*/-0.02 0.05/0.03 2.47/-0.50 16.55/-0.53 
Tweet volume (standardized) -0.08/0.04 0.09/0.07 -0.93/0.51 -0.85/0.67 
Mobilizing Interactions 0.53*/0.16* 0.01/0.01 39.93/20.94 1594.43/439.41 
Chronological tweet number 
(log. transformed) 
0.01/-0.01 0.02/0.01 0.30/-1.31 0.32/0.62 
Number of sequential accounts 0.26/0.04 0.14/0.11 1.88/0.41 3.14/0.08 
Number of followers 
(standardized) 
1.97/2.23* 1.22/0.86 1.61/2.59 2.61/6.69 




0.11/0.08 -1.27/-2.54 0.09/0.42 
Note. *p<.05. The number before ‘/’ indicates the result for the algorithm that used both 
 
10 To further verify that mobilizing interactions operates as a single construct, we ran an LMM in which we 
entered the dictionary categories anger, harm, collective action, threat, and twitter interactions separately 
alongside the other predictors (instead of the mobilizing interactions construct), predicting conformity with the 
extremist linguistic style. All positively predicted conformity, following the same pattern as the mobilizing 
interactions construct. Twitter interactions (@mentions) were negatively related to extremist classification. This 
may be an anomaly given that they positively correlate with harm and anger, and which are both positively 
related to conformity (Table 3). This unexpected result should be explored in future research. 
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Daesh vernacular and function words; the number after ‘/’ indicates the result for the 
algorithm that used only function words.  
We then repeated this analysis using the algorithm that relied only on function words 
and not Daesh vernacular and found the same results for mobilizing interactions and tweet 
type (Table 7). We also found a positive main effect for number of followers, and a negative 
main effect for number of accounts followed. 
Figure 2 
LMM Predicting Changes in the Probability of Individual Users being Classified as a 
Daesh Supporter via Mobilizing interactions. 
 
Note. Three levels of data are indicated as follows: tweets (individual points), users (black 
lines), and sample (blue line). Mobilizing interactions represent the factor scores of a latent 
variable comprising talk of anger, threat, harm, collective action, and Twitter interactions. 
The shaded area around the target line represents the standard error.  
To test for causal mediation, whereby conformity with the extremist linguistic style 
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increased over time (account age) through increases in mobilizing interactions (controlling 
for tweet type, relative time, number of sequential accounts, number of followers and number 
of accounts followed), we first fit the models for the mediator and outcome and then ran a 
causal mediation analysis (Imai, et al., 2010) in the Mediation package in R with 1000 
simulations. The average causal mediation effect of account age on increases in conformity to 
the extremist linguistic style through mobilizing interactions was non-significant (γ = .02; 
95% Quasi-Bayesian Confidence Intervals or CIs = -.005, .04; p = .14). The average direct 
effect of account age on conformity to the extremist linguistic style remained significant in 
the presence of the mediator (γ = .17; 95% CIs = .06, .28; p =.002); total effect = (γ = .19; 
95% CIs = .08, .31; p <.001).  
4. GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Taken together, this research presents evidence that within-person changes in 
conformity to a group’s vernacular and linguistic style can be captured in social media data. 
Across two studies, we present evidence that collective action intentions, and changes in both 
group vernacular and patterns of function word use, are positively associated with engaging 
in mobilizing interactions. As it is difficult for people to control their function word use in 
particular, this combination of findings supports our assertion that genuine psychological 
changes can occur through engaging in social media activity. Furthermore, for the first time, 
we demonstrated here that increases in conformity to extremist language can occur over time 
on social media platforms and are related to mobilizing interactions. These results therefore 
lend empirical weight both to politicians’ assertions that psychological changes, such as 
radicalization, might be observable through social media activity (Department for Digital, 
Culture, Media, & Sport, 2019; UK Home Affairs Committee, 2017), and for the 
psychological role of the internet in terrorism (Gill et al., 2017; Taylor et al., 2017) – 
although this would be need to be verified in future research with ground truth. Ultimately, 
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by investigating social media interactions over time in this way, we can increase our 
understanding both of the power of social media interactions as a socialization mechanism, 
and also of the process by which individuals could become socialized into extremist 
psychological groups online. This is important, because if you know the mechanism for 
changes such as increases in endorsement of violence, you can design interventions to disrupt 
those changes. 
Whilst Daesh supporter accounts varied in the extent to which they conformed to the 
vernacular and linguistic style of the gold-standard extremist tweets as a function of the 
extent to which they engaged in mobilizing interactions, this did not reflect a consistent and 
linear increase over time through those interactions. The direction of the effect is unclear: 
while past research suggests that mobilizing interactions may be a mechanism for 
psychological change, through increasing the extent to which people identify with a social 
change group or social movement (McGarty et al., 2014; Smith, Gavin, et al., 2015; Smith et 
al., 2018; Smith, Thomas, et al., 2015; Thomas et al., 2014; van Zomeren et al., 2008), it is 
also likely that people who identify with a group and for whom the group identity is salient 
(and show this through conforming more to the linguistic style) may engage in more 
mobilizing interactions as a result of conformity to ingroup norms (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; 
Turner, 1991). This is therefore likely to be a reciprocal process, and the absence of a direct 
linear relationship between mobilizing interactions and account age could reflect both the 
fluidity and dynamism of social identity salience over time – and the associated conformity to 
group norms/linguistic style.  
Both Daesh vernacular plus function words, and function words alone, could be 
accurately used to predict the class from which the tweet emanated. However, while we 
observed changes in linguistic style over time when using the algorithm that included Daesh 
vernacular and function words, this was not observable when the algorithm relied on function 
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words only. This suggests that linguistic style is more stable over time than vernacular, and 
thus using a combination of function words and vernacular is more useful in assessing 
change.  
We found that neither the Daesh-supporters’ number of followers nor the number of 
users that they followed was significantly related to linguistic conformity when using the 
algorithm that included Daesh vernacular, but when using only function words the users’ 
number of followers was positively related to linguistic conformity and the number of 
accounts they followed was negatively related to linguistic conformity. Overall, it did not 
appear that social isolation was (straightforwardly, at least) related to linguistic conformity. 
4.1 Practical Implications  
Our results are an adjunct to the proposal that radicalization trajectories can be 
detected using graph pattern matching algorithms to analyze fused data from social media 
and government/law enforcement agencies (Hung, et al., 2016; 2017), and research that 
attempts to identify signals for detecting terror threats (Brynielsson, Horndahl, Johansson, 
Kaati, Mårtenson, & Svenson, 2013). Importantly, our work differs in focus by elucidating 
the mechanisms of social media interactions and communication that predict within-person 
change, and thus could further enhance the discriminatory ability of such algorithms.  
Now we have provided proof-of-concept for our method, it could be deployed to 
examine different types of changes. For example, future research should aim to distinguish 
between the mechanisms by which, and nature of, social media interactions that socialize 
individuals into violent extremist groups, and into (non-extremist) groups more broadly. This 
future research would require investigation into how interlocutors’ perceptions of their intra- 
and intergroup context shape the content of their interactions, and thus the meaning of their 
shared psychological group membership and the kinds of group-normative actions they 
advocate.  
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The ability to model group socialization more broadly could bring insights to research 
and practice in other disciplines. For example, work in other domains has explored the 
identifying linguistic features associated with psychopathology (Junghaenel, Smyth, & 
Santner, 2008) such as schizophrenia (Bedi, et al., 2015; Lee, Lee, Ahn, & Kim, 2007). While 
the method we developed here (involving mobilizing interactions as a group socialization 
mechanism) is specific to modeling group socialization and detecting changes in 
psychological group memberships, it is possible that through social media interactions, 
people can develop social identification with others who are experiencing the same mental 
disorder (Haslam, Jetten, Cruwys, Dingle, & Haslam, 2018). According to Haslam and 
colleagues, this social bond with others who are experiencing similar mental health 
difficulties can provide a “social cure”. Therefore, future research could explore the potential 
of the current method to be adapted for clinician use. 
Most importantly, our evidence supports the notion that not only psychological state 
(e.g., Bedi, Carrillo, et al., 2015; Chung & Pennebaker, 2007; Losada, Crestani, & Parapar, 
2017; Pennebaker, 2011), but changes in psychological state are detectable through natural 
language processing. Past research has been able to track general trends in word-
use/semantics on social media platforms over time (for example, Kulkarni, Al-Rfou, Perozzi, 
& Skiena, 2015), but this has not been done at the individual user level. Whilst Shrestha et al. 
(2017), Hung et al. (2017), and Abbasi and Chen (2005) showed that extremist messages can 
be detected using machine learning algorithms that discriminate using feature sets, again that 
past work did not index changes in those features in longitudinal data from individuals. In 
theory, in any context in which researchers or practitioners are interested in quantifying 
changes in psychological state, this method could be further explored. Validation with ground 
truth data would need to be the first step in this regard. 
4.2 Limitations and ethical considerations 
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Our data and our conclusions are limited by the absence of ground truth data in this 
study (i.e., we do not have offline variables to triangulate with online behaviors). In fact, 
there are no open source ground truth datasets with which to validate a set of features 
associated with online support for Daesh (i.e., that includes the social media data of people 
known to be affiliated with Daesh offline – for example, people who have travelled to Syria 
to join Daesh or to become foreign fighters). Therefore, all research that claims to identify 
online posts by (and online features of) supporters of Daesh share this limitation. Without 
longitudinal ground truth data containing demographic variables and standardized 
psychological measures, we cannot investigate potential confounds, nor ascertain whether the 
changes in linguistic style are associated with other psychological changes. Furthermore, we 
cannot and do not wish to make any claims or assumptions about the users in this sample 
beyond the fact that each user explicitly and publicly expressed support for Daesh in their 
tweets (to the extent that the accounts were suspended for violating Twitter’s terms of use). 
Future research should aim to explore how changes in these expressions relate to changes in 
psychological variables, such as social identification with the group and adherence to group 
norms. Given the absence of ground truth data, we have chosen not to publicly disclose the 
feature set or the Daesh vernacular dictionary due to the potential that they could be used to 
falsely identify individuals as supporters of violent extremism.  
A second reason not to disclose the Daesh feature set is that there is no complete 
consensus on features across different research projects. Feature sets vary because of the lack 
of open source ground truth data with which to validate the features. Features are also time 
sensitive, so even if ground truth data were available, the features would become outdated as 
social media behavior evolved. Thus, the accuracy of the features and vernacular used in this 
study is likely to change over time. To establish the temporal stability of the features and 
their predictive validity, future research should use longitudinal ground truth data that 
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provides independent verification of how changes in group affiliation and offline behavior of 
the users relates to changes in features. Notwithstanding these limitations, the purpose of this 
research was to develop a new method to explore changes in linguistic style over time, rather 
than to create a time-independent, validated algorithm, feature set, or lexicon. 
We should also be clear that the nature of our social media data necessarily limits the 
generalizability of our algorithm and feature set. Our Twitter data were comprised of short 
sentences (no longer than 140 characters) and were in English. The Twitter timelines spanned 
a relatively short time-frame and we used a relatively small number of accounts in our 
analyses. Therefore, the coefficients in our algorithm are specific to data with these features 
and cannot be generalized to different social media platforms, to the population of Daesh 
supporters more generally, or other forms of textual or spoken communication. Having said 
that, we were able to use this dataset to provide and train a relatively accurate classifier (even 
though accuracy per se was not our methodological goal), thus demonstrating that even with 
limited data, this method is viable. 
Prior to data collection, Twitter suspended accounts for violating their terms of use. 
Whilst accounts had in common expression of support for Daesh, without ground truth we 
could not ascertain whether or not they were official Daesh media officers’ accounts or 
unofficial supporter accounts. The changes in linguistic style we evidenced here therefore 
could have captured an evolving group narrative or style, or we could have captured changes 
that users made in response to Twitter’s suspension activity. The latter is unlikely because 
users (as advised in Dabiq, Daesh’ official publication) tended to use less, rather than more 
(as evidenced here) extremist features if they aimed to avoid suspension. Furthermore, whilst 
this might be the case for changes in vernacular, it is unlikely for linguistic style, which is 
more difficult to cultivate. More importantly however, notwithstanding this ambiguity about 
the causes of the changes we witnessed in our dataset, the key contribution of this research is 
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that we developed and tested a new paradigm with which such changes can be detected and 
modelled. That is, irrespective of the meaning behind the change, we provide here the first 
method that can capture such change. This paves the way for future research to isolate and 
validate linguistic patterns associated with psychological, social, and behavioral changes, 
respectively.  
4.3 Conclusions 
We contribute a significant advancement by presenting a method that can potentially 
model changes in expressions of extremism rather than detecting extremist posts per se. In 
doing so, we have created and validated a methodology and analytic strategy for extracting 
longitudinal psychological processes and evidence of within-person change from large 
samples of social media data. We have demonstrated that a relatively straightforward 
linguistic analysis can derive the feature vectors for Daesh-supporter classification, and that a 
linear function can be used to transform lexicon scores and social media metrics into a 
meaningful psychological factor capturing mobilizing interactions. Ultimately, this method 
can be adapted to any research context in which it is useful to capture within-person 
psychological change.
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